Textual analysis of various doctrines of empire dealing directly with the question of colonization has revealed a strategic throughline: the provision of rational justification for the erasure of indigenous modes of life. This justification is derived implicitly from normative arguments ranging from the shamelessly ignorant language of the Laws of Burgos to Hegel’s ambitious theoretical project. A framework claiming to advance universal freedom while necessitating the unequal distribution of freedom is inherently contradictory. Thoughtful critique must begin with intimate interrogation of the assumptions upon which the theory rests; thus this paper will argue that Hegel's framework cannot coherently advance a universal consciousness of freedom or genuine "world interest” as it articulates a conception of freedom that structurally requires non-European peoples' unfreedom–contradicting its own universal pretensions.

The justification that Hegel provides for colonization is primarily a historio-economic one; both industry and the expansion that it requires are key drivers of the Weltinteresse (world interest), thus distinguishing colonial activity as both natural and necessary. Understanding industry and the trade that accompanies it as historically necessary, he concludes that “civil society is thus driven to found colonies”. Hegel’s approach initially appears to evade the critique of subjectivity/particularity,a critique frequently leveled against theorists like Locke or Mill. However, his theory still rests on inherently subjective assumptions given the weight of universality. In paragraph 247, Hegel outlines a developmental hierarchy based on a nation’s relationship to the sea: 

To realise what an instrument of culture lies in the link with the sea, consider countries where industry flourishes and contrast their relation to the sea with that of countries which have eschewed sea-faring and which, like Egypt and India, have become stagnant and in the most frightful and scandalous superstition. Notice also how all great progressive peoples press onward to the sea.

Hegel’s claim that Sea-faring peoples are enterprising and creative, while land-bound peoples are stagnant and stuck in superstition ignores any notion of cultural relativism, giving a particular mode of life and production the weight of historical right. It gives European colonialism a civilizing character while framing it economically. In paragraph 248, Hegel expands on this economic incentive, referencing the necessity of the colonies in facilitating “new demand and field for its [civil society’s] industry.” The important theoretical move here is the conflation of a particular mode of production and the culture/world-perspective that it produces with a universal world-conception. Intercultural interaction in the Hegelian framework is thus inextricably underscored by a distinctly European conception of economy and trade. It is from this ideological position that Hegel presents colonization as a necessary stage in freedom’s development. 

Colonization involves the violent denial of self-determination (structurally, epistemically, and physically); Hegel's primary violence is epistemic, denying recognition of non-European forms of life and thought. The structural and physical violence of colonialism find their justification in the epistemic. This is the primary theoretical mechanism at work that we have identified in other theories of civil society dealing with the question of colonization. Any theory that claims universality simply cannot provide this rational justification for cultural erasure. Hegel’s assertion that colonization is a mutually beneficial relationship completely ignores both the necessity of intercultural dialogue for the construction of any universal notion of human consciousness and the totalizing nature of colonial violence. Hegel's framework rests on culturally specific European value judgments of philosophical consciousness and statehood presented as universal. As noted by Jamila Mascat in her article Hegel, Colonialism and Postcolonial Hegelianism, he remarks in paragraph 331 (Philosophy of Right)  that “in the case of a nomadic people, for example, or any people at a low level of culture, the question even arises of how far this people can be regarded as a state.” Evaluated in tandem with his broader conceptualization of colonialism as a dialectical necessity, we see the simultaneous enshrinement of certain social and moral value judgments as universal alongside the exclusion of certain cultural populations from historical personhood. Mascat goes on to provide additional textual evidence to develop a clearer understanding of Hegel on statehood, 

He maintains that ‘full personal freedom, full free property, can emerge only in states with a specific principle’ (LPWH 22–23: 190). In contrast, the colonized live in a peculiar initial stage ‘in which a nation [Volk] is not a state’ (PR: §349, 375). As he explains, ‘if the nation, as ethical substance […] does not have this form, it lacks the objectivity of possessing a universal and universally valid existence [Dasein] for itself and others in [the shape of] laws as determinations of thought, and is therefore not recognized; since its independence has no objective legality or firmly established rationality for itself, it is merely formal and does not amount to sovereignty’ (Mascat, 131)

She goes on to emphasize that despite his potentially problematic musings on statehood, the primary thrust of his argument remains an economic-historical one. However, the economic argument cannot exist outside the assumptions of philosophical personhood and statehood that define its parameters. For example, even though Germany “ist kein staat mehr [is no longer a state]”, they still qualify for the distinction of personhood because their ideological and productive orientations are historically positionally correct for the advancement of the Weltinteresse. The political project for the ‘civilized’ world is the pursuit of the abstract conception of absolute freedom. Indigenous populations, not yet having been enlightened, cannot participate intellectually in the pursuit of absolute freedom under Hegel’s framework because the differences in modes of life are interpreted as backward and barbaric. This theoretical perspective advances a particular Enlightenment-era conception of the individual and the state, and in a sense goes even further than so many other attempts to rationalize colonial domination by giving it the weight of historical necessity. 

Construction of a universal theory of historical development must give all human experience and perspective equal moral weight. When the particular bleeds into theorization of the universal, subjugation of certain populations takes on the weight of moral right. This risk is much more serious for the Hegelian project due to its dialectical conception of history. If all of history is viewed as the constant unfolding of the human consciousness, the dialectical method can be hastily used to provide retroactive justification for any historical event, including the erasure of different perspectives and modes of life from collective memory. Any musings on universality must operate from a truly universal conception of the human right to life and experience. A framework that structurally requires the unfreedom of some as a "stage" in the development of freedom contradicts the very concept of universal freedom. Hegel’s framework necessarily requires epistemological violence against indigenous populations and universalizes a specific mode of life and thought. 

Cover artwork by Julian Chadwin.